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Abstract
Strategic uncertainties are frequently encountered in policy
situations. The behavior of actors in policy networks is often
unpredictable, while the success of a given actor may depend
on decisions of other actors. It seems rational to presume that
strategic risks are taken into consideration besides expected out-
comes in policy decision making.
In the present paper we outline an analogy between stock
markets and policy situations. It is conjectured that similarly
to stockholders who diversify their portfolios to maximize ex-
pected returns at a given level of riskiness, policy actors also
evaluate the diversity of their ‘portfolio of relations’ and tune
the assumed risks in individual relationships accordingly. The
main hypothesis of the paper is that if the number of relation-
ships grows (viz. unpredictable variations in partners’ behav-
ior increasingly compensate each other), policy actors will as-
sume greater risks in individual relations. Thus, we surmise that
strategic risks can be diversified by relationship portfolios.
A survey of Hungarian environmental NGOs was carried out
to prove the hypothesis. Statistical results confirmed our as-
sumption at the 99% confidence level. To our knowledge, this
is the first direct evidence that the boldness of a policy strategy
depends on the number of partners. More generally, the nov-
elty of the present work lies in the useful analogy between stock
markets and an environmental policy situation, and the demon-
strated connection between the number of partners and the as-
sumed strategic risks.
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1 Introduction
Environmental policy problems are usually of high complex-
ity [6]. To begin with, large amounts of scientific knowledge
are needed to understand the nature of a feature environmen-
tal problem. The required data are not always easily acces-
sible and proper modeling of phenomena can also be compli-
cated. Second, a number of different actors with different in-
formation, knowledge, objectives, strategies and influence can
be involved, interlinked by different relationships [11]. Govern-
mental and non-governmental, for-profit and not-for-profit orga-
nizations compete or collaborate to reach their respective goals.
Third, institutional settings affect the chances of different actors
and outcomes of the policy process [3].
All these factors of complexity bear different sources of un-
certainties. The lack of scientific knowledge is called cognitive
uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty refers to the role of unpre-
dictable behavior of a certain actor directly or indirectly affect-
ing other actors’ success. Institutional uncertainty arises, be-
cause decisions are made in different places under different cir-
cumstances at different levels of the decision making system [4].
While the role of cognitive uncertainties in decision making
is an integral part of the scientific literature, the focus of the
present article is on strategic uncertainties. The presented idea
about the reduction of strategic hazards may also be generalized
and applied to institutional uncertainties.
Strategic considerations of a given actor involved in the policy
process imply risks for those partners whose success depends on
the given decision. Their optimal strategy may depend on the
decision of the partner – outcomes are often determined by sets
of strategies. If the strategy of a partner is unknown, then it can
be represented by a stochastic variable. Actors may estimate
probabilities of different behaviors based on their experiences.
However, the measurement of such probabilities is virtually im-
possible in real policy situations. The actions of given actors can
not be repeated many times under the same conditions to build
statistics. Moreover, complex policy situations can not be inter-
preted without the context in which the processes are embedded,
so it is not easy to draw conclusions from comparative studies.
The bottom-up approach to explain actors’ behavior fails due to
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similar reasons: game theoretic models otherwise amenable to
measure and predict strategic behavior in risky situations [8] are
way too abstract to be applicable to real life phenomena.
Consequently, albeit the momentous role of strategic uncer-
tainty is often highlighted in policy literature (see e.g. [1] ), its
relation with a number of different factors describing the policy
process (e.g. structural characteristics of the actor network) is
unclear. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the
relation between strategic uncertainties and a basic structural at-
tribute; the number of partners. If we are able to reveal such a
connection, this parameter can be included in strategic planning.
Throughout the article we investigate a suggestive case where
an NGO tries to change the practice of companies to improve
their environmental performance. There are many ways to do
so: the strategy chosen by the NGO can be friendly and cooper-
ative, or it can be very ambitious and vehement, sometimes even
aggressive. In the case of a friendlier strategy targeting minor
changes, step by step progress can almost surely be expected.
More aggressive strategies offer the chance of rapid changes
but also raise the possibility of complete denial of any improve-
ments. Accordingly, strategic uncertainty grows as the strategy
becomes increasingly aggressive. Environmental organizations
have to balance their high-flying objectives with leniency to re-
duce the risk of denial.
This optimization resembles the behavior of risk-averse (or
loss-averse) investors in stock markets. They also search
for maximum returns and try to minimize uncertainties called
volatility in their case. Similarities between stock markets and
strategic decision making encouraged the elaboration of the out-
lined analogy between the two seemingly distant fields. Section
2 is devoted to the analogy itself: notions from the two fields are
matched to each other and portfolio building observed in stock
markets is translated into a respective non-trivial, hitherto un-
known strategic behavior. Section 3 summarizes the way we
measured the effect with questions on hypothetic situations – a
method borrowed from investment theory as well. Section 4 is
for the statistical evaluation of the results obtained in our survey,
supplemented by comments on the validity and applicability of
the results. Conclusions and perspectives are given in Section 5.
2 The analogy and the ensuing hypothesis
The analogy
We compare stock markets and policy systems. In the stock
market the subject of the investigation is a stockholder. In the
policy system, we analyze an NGO that is in connection with
some companies of a given branch of business. (Obviously, it
is advisory to choose the simplest system that shows the studied
behavior. In this case there are no complex effects of unknown
origins that are typical in the case of complicated structures.)
The aim of the stockholder is to maximize returns. The aim of
the NGO is to maximize the environmental performance of the
companies.
The means that allow the respective actors to reach their goals
are buying stocks and establishing connections with companies,
respectively. Thus, having stocks in the one field is matched to
having connections with companies in the other.
Here we note that there is a difference between the two cases.
Stockholders can change two parameters – the type of the stock
that determines its riskiness and the amount they buy; while
NGOs can only change the riskiness of their strategy, they ei-
ther have one connection or not, there is no intermediate case.
However, if we imagine a hypothetical stock market, where in-
vestors can either purchase a stock for a given sum or they can
not buy any of it, their incentives to build portfolios – the central
topic of the present paper expanded later – are not eliminated.
So, in such a “discretized” market, where stock amounts can not
be freely changed, investors still build portfolios to reduce risks
at a certain level of expected returns [12]. They seek for the
least imperfect combinations where expected returns are high
and volatility is low. Fig. 1. shows a very simple example of
diversification in a “discretized market” with a discretized ef-
ficient frontier (only the black dots are possible states). E.g.
holding Stock 2 is suboptimal, so there are investors with given
risk-aversion who diversify their portfolios. (The goal of di-
versification is to jump up and left from point to point in the
expected return – volatility graph.)
 
Fig. 1. Diversification in a “discretized market”
Success is determined by the returns of the stock and the be-
havior of the company, respectively. The analogy is sound, be-
cause the factor that measures success is a stochastic variable
determined by the complex behavior of the whole system of the
stock market or the policy arena. (Moreover, if an investor has
several different stocks or an NGO has several different rela-
tions, returns are positively correlated. These changes in similar
directions are caused by, inter alia, macro-economic effects and
peer pressure, respectively.)
The assumed risks are given by the bought stock itself in stock
markets and the boldness of the strategy in NGO-company re-
lations. The analogy is clear: the bigger the assumed risk is,
the higher the expected returns are. In concrete: more volatile
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stocks have higher expected returns [15] and bolder (and thus
riskier) strategies are used to achieve greater results. (Arguably,
the boldness of the strategy is correlated with strategic risks: the
bolder the strategy is, the bigger is the chance that the proposal
will be denied. However, in case of success, bolder strategies
deliver better results than less daring ones.) For a summary of
the analogies see Table 1.
Although, the fact that there is no unequivocal value of the
assumed risk in the policy case leaves two opportunities open.
Either the curve of expected returns against boldness has a max-
imum and NGOs try to find this point, viz. they maximize ex-
pected returns; or expected returns and strategic risks are eval-
uated together by risk-averse (or loss-averse) NGOs. Notwith-
standing that the expected returns fall if NGOs become too ag-
gressive (i.e. expected returns, indeed, have a maximum as a
function of boldness); it is still possible that strategic uncertain-
ties are also considered viz. indifference curves are not horizon-
tal in Fig. 2.
Thus, we need to distinguish risk-averse behavior from the
sheer maximization of expected returns. To tell apart risk-
neutral and risk-averse behavior we look at portfolios. Similarly
to stock markets, where portfolios are built to diversify risks,
it is possible that NGOs evaluate expected results and strate-
gic uncertainties together. In stock markets, investors build di-
verse portfolios and strive to reduce volatility at a given level of
expected returns by holding different stocks so that oppositely
directed fluctuations in returns compensate each other. Alterna-
tively, this is the way how at a given level of volatility expected
returns can be maximized.
If the case is similar in the policy arena, the boldness of
NGO’s chosen strategy can be affected by the constitution of
their ‘portfolio of relations’. If the number of the companies
they try to affect grows, variations in their behavior (defining
the given NGO’s success) will compensate each other – exactly
as the volatility of portfolios decreases as the number of stocks
in the portfolio (whose returns are not fully correlated) grows.
Hence, a similar reduction in strategic uncertainties is possible.
However, if NGOs were risk-neutral, they would not care about
strategic uncertainties and they would use the same strategy re-
gardless of the number of the partners to maximize expected
returns in individual relations.
The main hypothesis of the present paper is the following: if
the number of the companies, with which a given NGO is con-
nected, grows, its strategy to influence their behavior will be-
come bolder. More generally, we conjecture that actors in the
business of policy are risk-averse and they can be characterized
by a certain level of risk tolerance. Consequently, if strategic un-
certainty falls (as the number of partners grows) their response
will be to assume greater risks in their individual relations. The
adjustment of the assumed risks, the treatment of uncertainties is
similar to stockholders’ behavior in stock markets: policy actors
diversify strategic risks.
Preliminary remarks
Before going into details about the proof of the hypothesis, we
list some notable remarks. First, unlike investors who can freely
choose their portfolio elements, the required connections in pol-
icy situations are sometimes given. Resources like powers, sta-
tus, legitimacy, knowledge, information, or money may necessi-
tate the inclusion of given actors [11]. In the exemplary case of
the environmental performance of businesses, NGOs may try to
influence all companies in a given area, so their opportunities to
choose partners can be strongly restricted. However, that means
no restrictions in terms of the assumed risk, because riskiness
can be tuned by the chosen strategies. So, the outlined analogy
is not distorted.
Second, if we are talking about an NGO and its several rela-
tionships, the boldness of strategies can be different in different
relations. From a theoretical point of view, the clearest form
of our hypothesis can be formulated for those partners whose
approach is unknown, because then there is no reason to pur-
sue different strategies in different relations. Though, strategies
of the NGO can be significantly different if partners are known
to be cooperative, indifferent or hostile. Nevertheless, it is al-
ways possible (independently of the approach of the partners)
to change the assumed strategic risk according to the number of
partners. The only difference is that it is more difficult to discern
the effect of changes in strategic uncertainties if there are other
strategic concerns.
More generally, a third concern is that there are a number of
other factors that influence the boldness of the strategy. Obvi-
ously, the public acceptance of the goals of the NGO, the com-
plexity of the issue strongly linked to its marketability, the avail-
able time, power relations and several other factors affect strate-
gic decisions. However, the fact that the number of partners is
not always decisive in strategic considerations does not mean
that its role is negligible. Our aim was to separate the effects of
the number of connections and demonstrate that it is indeed a
constituent in strategic decision making.
Risk theory – basic dilemmas and methods of measure-
ment
Since we wish to perform measurements regarding behavior
under uncertainties, exact measurement instructions are needed.
These instructions are based on a theory – we need to define
the parameter under study. Conclusions drawn from empirical
results are theory based, too. Consequently, we outline basic
questions of risk theory – originally developed to describe be-
havior of actors in stock markets – so that we can ask proper
questions and evaluate results in policy situations.
It is generally assumed in modern portfolio theory that in-
vestors try to avoid risk. The original theory interpreted risk
aversion by assessing the expected utility of wealth before and
after an investment. The concave utility function of wealth was
deemed to be responsible for risk aversion [2].
Recently it was unequivocally shown that Markowitz’s origi-
Diversification of strategic uncertainties 832008 16 2
Tab. 1. Analogies between stock markets and policy situations
Stock market Policy situation
Subject of the study a stockholder an NGO
Risky means of actions stocks relationships
Success factor stock returns company behavior
Assumed risk (single actions) stock volatility boldness of the strategy
A factor in portfolio building number of different stocks number of relationships?
Ensuing strategy diversification ???
 Fig. 2. Expected returns against the boldness of the strategy (thick line), and the indifference curves of a given policy decision maker
nal theory and its later versions give infinitely high risk aversion
for high values and total risk neutrality at lower values of wealth
[14]. This contradicts real world observations: we buy lottery
tickets and cheap insurances. Accordingly, the emphasis was
shifted to the theory that regards the expected utility of income
(viz. potential changes in wealth) as the fundamental variable.
Instead of the initial and final values, the potential positive and
negative changes in wealth were compared to calculate the ex-
pected utility of income and make a decision in a risky situation
[5]. At the same time, loss aversion (originally described by
Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979 [10]) was proposed instead of
risk aversion as the organizing principle of actions in risky situ-
ations [13].
However, problems of the new model and contradictions with
portfolio theory (e.g. portfolio-independent investments) were
realized soon (e.g. [9]). Hybrid models were elaborated to in-
corporate all observed features into a single model. However,
up to now, there is no convenient, universally accepted model to
describe risk or loss aversion.
On the other hand, what is common in all these models is
that actors react to uncertainties with changes in their behav-
ior. These changes are actor dependent and researchers try to
represent actor-specific attributes with risk tolerance or loss tol-
erance factors, whose measurement methods are quite similar.
Fortunately, the effect we would like to demonstrate is analo-
gous to this common point of the theories: right now, our aim is
to show how behavior changes in policy situations under uncer-
tain conditions. The clarification of causes, answers to the why
questions are tasks of the future. However, similarities between
financial and political decisions could one day allow potential
breakthroughs in the one field to have seminal consequences in
the other. Nevertheless, as for now, we should turn our attention
to the measurement techniques applied to investigate behavior
under risk.
As articulated earlier, we surmise that actors in the world
of policy can also be characterized by a certain level of risk
tolerance. Hanna et al. observed that there are at least four
methods of measuring risk tolerance [7] : asking about invest-
ment choices, asking a combination of investment and subjective
questions, assessing actual behavior, and asking questions based
on hypothetical scenarios.
As stated in the introductory part, assessment of actual be-
havior is not a very promising opportunity in the case of policy.
Asking about real life choices can also result in distorted results,
because we can not study a sufficiently large sample to level out
other effects stemming from different factors that influence be-
havior. Thus, we chose hypothetical scenarios as a measurement
method. Here the role of the number of the actors can be inves-
tigated in a ‘pure’ form and the sample of the query is not re-
stricted to organizations that have already encountered cases in
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which they changed their strategies due to changes in the num-
ber of their partners. Details of our survey and its results are
given in the next section.
3 The survey
Surveyed organizations
Our aim was to study the behavior of NGOs that pursue envi-
ronmental activities and see how their strategies change if there
are changes in the composition of their ‘portfolio of relations’.
We looked for NGOs that may get in touch with companies and
try to affect their behavior. We restricted the scope of investiga-
tions to Hungarian NGOs for two reasons. First, the fact that we
studied organizations in a single country allowed us to further
reduce the number of parameters (social settings, organizational
culture etc.) that could have affected strategic considerations.
Second, it was easier to reach Hungarian organizations and we
could endeavor to contact nearly all of the environmental NGOs
in the country.
We used the comprehensive web page “nonprofit.hu” to find
NGOs. We searched for NGOs that marked environmental pro-
tection as one of their activities. We listed 253 different orga-
nizations that had proper electronic contact information, actual-
ized their data in the last two years, and could receive 1% tax
donations (implying that they were more or less serious orga-
nizations). As there were some umbrella organizations among
these, the original list represented approximately 300 organiza-
tions. We sent out a survey electronically (as an attached docu-
ment) with 9 questions to all of these NGOs. Unfortunately, 47
email addresses turned out to be incorrect or unavailable. Even-
tually, even after we repeated the query, we received meager 30
completed surveys. Thus, we targeted the inactive NGOs with
an email consisting of only the most crucial question and asked
them to reply in one word. These renewed efforts paid off in the
form of 28 more answers.
Hence, we could build statistics from 58 separate answers
from 58 different NGOs. However, we had only one question
to rely on; supplementary questions included in the original sur-
vey could only be used as weaker guidance based on the first 30
results.
Survey questions
In the original survey we asked 9 questions (see the whole sur-
vey in the Appendix). Apart from our central questions (1-3) we
asked questions about the validity of our theory (4-5) and tried
to gain information about other factors (approach and status of
the partner) influencing strategic considerations (6-8). Finally,
we asked about real-life examples.
After assessing the first 30 results, we saw that our hypothesis
is likely to be confirmed. Out of the first three questions, we
chose the one that seemed to be most common in reality: the
case when NGOs try to influence companies (Question 1 in our
survey):
Suppose that your NGO would like to affect some companies
in a given branch of business so that they improve their environ-
mental performance. Depending on the number of companies,
how would you change your strategy? Would you shift to bolder
or to more cautious strategy if you tried to influence more com-
panies?
1 We would not change our strategy.
2 We would use bolder strategy.
3 We would use more cautious strategy.
We emailed this question to our list again and received 28 fur-
ther answers. As it is obvious from the question, our goal was
to reveal the mechanism of risk aversion in the policy case and
we did not strive to render quantitative parameters to the ob-
served behavior. Arguably, statistical evaluation of the answers
can shed light on the altered behavior of policy actors under risk.
Results
In the case the fundamental question 32 of 58 respondents
chose bolder strategies, 17 organizations would not change their
strategy, and only 9 organizations answered that they would ap-
ply more cautious strategies.
Supplemented by the data collected from full surveys, results
are given in Table 2. (Question 2 and 3 were similar to the
one above, the only difference was that instead of companies
partners were decision makers and other organizations, respec-
tively.)
Tab. 2. Results: strategic changes caused by changes in the number of part-
ners
“no changes” “bolder” “more cautious”
Complete results 17 (29,3%) 32 (55,2%) 9 (15,5%)
Survey Question 1 12 (40,0%) 15 (50,0%) 3 (10,0%)
Survey Question 2 8 (26,7%) 14 (46,7%) 8 (26,7%)
Survey Question 3 10 (33,3%) 14 (44,7%) 6 (20,0%)
4 Evaluation
The central hypothesis
To begin the evaluation, we focus on the central question
posed in the previous section. As there were three choices, we
can use a modified version of binomial analysis. In the case of a
random distribution of the answers, the probability of each an-
swer is 1/3. The probability that there are x answers from one
type out of the 58 answers is:
P(x) =
(
58
x
)
·
(
1
3
)x
·
(
2
3
)58−x
= 58!
x! · (58− x)! ·
258−x
358
.
Our aim is to see that the number of positive answers (bolder
strategies) is too high and the number of negative answers (more
cautious strategies) is too low to be coincidental. We could ar-
rive at such statements if we calculated the confidence intervals
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at the 99% confidence level. So, the task is to calculate N and
M so that
N∑
x=1
P(x) ≥ 0, 99 and
58∑
x=M
P(x) ≥ 0, 99. Numerical
calculations give N = 28 and M = 11.
As our results (32 and 9) are not in the 99% confidence in-
tervals (1. . . 28 and 11. . . 58, respectively), we have to reject the
assumption that we sampled a random distribution at the 99%
confidence level.
Consequently, our hypothesis that policy actors typically shift
to bolder strategies if the number of their partners grows, can be
accepted at the 99% confidence level. Both the particularly high
proportions of positive answers and the particularly low propor-
tions of negative answers corroborate the central hypothesis of
this paper.
(The statistical analysis was repeated with the statistical soft-
ware SPSS 15. Results obtained with its Binomial Test were
perfectly the same that we got manually from the above calcu-
lations.)
Similar but weaker statements hold for the 30 original survey
results. The proportion of positive answers lies out of the 90%
confidence interval for all of the first 3 questions. Except for
question no. 2, the low proportion of negative results can also
be accepted to be non-accidental at the 90% confidence level.
Validity and applicability
In order to get rid of ambiguities, we have to point out some
implicit assumptions and make a few more remarks. First,
throughout the query we implicitly assumed that unidirectional
changes of the number of partners shift strategies in the same
direction, viz. there are no distinguished numbers of partners
where these trends turn to their opposites. However evident this
claim may look, we asked a question about it in our survey. 21
of 30 respondents confirmed that this implicit assumption was
right, while most of those who expressed negative opinions did
not fully understand the question as it became obvious from their
concerns. Until now, we have not found a reason why strategic
shifts would abruptly turn to their opposites if the changes in the
number of partners continued in the same direction, so we do
not deem this assumption to be problematic.
Second, we may conjecture that an NGO applies the same
strategy in its relations with different partners whose status and
role in the given case is identical. If partners are unknown, this
may be a rational choice. Furthermore, sometimes it is impor-
tant to apply the same strategy in different relations to be and
look fair. However, as 12 of 30 respondents pointed out, it is
possible that other factors (e.g. the known approach of given ac-
tors) influence strategies and the conjecture does not hold. Here
we have to emphasize again that it does not cause problems with
the theory: different strategies may be shifted simultaneously
due to changes in the number of actors, no matter how variant
they are. The only effect is that it will be more difficult to reveal
the phenomenon under study if there are other major strategic
concerns.
Third, the sample size was not sufficiently large to draw con-
clusions regarding the role of the following factors: the NGO’s
size, the role or the status of the partners (companies, decision
makers, organizations; important or less important roles in the
case), or the approach of the partners (positive, negative, neu-
tral, unknown). Further studies are needed to clarify the effects
attributed to these factors.
Fourth, our analysis studied NGOs with environmental objec-
tives, but we are convinced that the demonstrated phenomenon
is much more general. Probably it is not always so easy to con-
struct proper hypothetical cases as it was in the outlined inves-
tigation, but it seems to be plausible that the underlying mecha-
nisms are the same in a wide range of policy situations. Conse-
quently, the demonstrated research is deemed to be a manifesta-
tion of a general risk (or loss) avoiding behavior characterizing
actors in the world of policy. The presented theory has thus
practical implications for a variety of actors in the political bat-
tlefield.
Fifth, it is also possible that policy actors do not only diver-
sify strategic risks, but also they use the same method to reduce
institutional uncertainties. That could be a reason for political
actors to have strong ties to other actors being active in different
policy arenas (e.g. it can be profitable for moderate politicians
to have connections to radical NGOs). However, the thorough
analysis of institutional uncertainties from a diversification point
of view is only a future opportunity to date.
5 Conclusions and perspectives
In this article we have formulated an analogy between stock
markets and policy situations. The foundational idea of the pa-
per was that actors in such different contexts react to uncertain-
ties in similar fashions. Expected returns and risks are evaluated
together to optimize behavior. If there are simultaneous efforts
to achieve success (an investor holds more different stocks or
a policy actor has more different relations), then fluctuations
in outcomes can compensate each other. Thus, diversification
offers the chance to minimize uncertainties at a given level of
expected returns, or to maximize returns at a given level of un-
certainties. Actors in both fields tend to make use of such oppor-
tunities. However, while the phenomenon has been well known
in stock markets for more than five decades now, diversification
of strategic uncertainties has not been identified before.
The revealed analogy is tested on the sample of Hungarian
environmental NGOs. The hypothesis that the composition of
the actor network is related to the assumed risk in individual
relations is analyzed by hypothetical questions. The central ar-
gument that supports the hypothesis of diversification – the as-
sumption that a growing number of partners inspires NGOs to
apply bolder strategies to improve their environmental perfor-
mance – can be accepted at the 99% confidence level.
The observed behavior in risky situations may help to include
a new aspect – the number of partners – into strategic consid-
erations. This hitherto unconsciously applied factor in deci-
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sion making can be incorporated into strategic planning. On
the longer run, further steps can be made to clarify the role of
policy network structures in strategic considerations. In a sim-
ilar way to economics, attempts can be made to render param-
eters to risk or loss avoidance and quantify different actors’ ap-
proach to risky situations. However, problems encountered in
economics are likely to occur in the policy case as well, and ad-
ditional difficulties are also expected due to worse measurability
opportunities.
Nevertheless, we hope that both the theoretical construct
which serves as the base of the analogy and the conclusions
drawn from the survey of environmental NGOs can be benefi-
cial – not only in the business of environmental policy.
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Appendix
Behavior under risk – a study of environmental NGOs
I. Introduction
In the following we ask questions about strategic decisions of
NGOs pursuing environmental activities. The aim of the study
is to analyze opinions of the surveyed organizations about risky
situations. We examine cases in which environmentalists try to
change the behavior of certain economic, social or political ac-
tors (e.g. companies, schools, local governments, decision mak-
ers etc.).
The more or less unpredictable behavior of the actors they try
to affect means risk for the NGOs. Depending on how ambi-
tious their goals are and how vehement they are in persuasion,
they can expect different results. While small step strategies
offer minor changes with very good chances; bolder plans and
stronger actions may result in significant changes for the better,
but at the same time chances of a complete denial of sugges-
tions grow. In the following we would like to study how the
boldness/cautiousness of the strategy is related to the number of
partners.
The survey is sent to a broad range of Hungarian NGOs pursu-
ing environmental activities. Results obtained in the study may
help to make strategic decisions and could contribute to the vi-
talization of our civil society. Outcomes of the statistical evalu-
ation will be sent to all respondents without specifying concrete
organizations.
If you have any questions or comments, please indicate them
in the Comments section.
Thank you for your kind assistance!
II. Survey
Throughout the survey, we use the term cautious strategy, if
the NGO is in partnership with the organization or person it tries
to affect. Continuous efforts are made to reach agreement, the
good relationship is very important for the NGO. Steps of ac-
tions are usually planned jointly, small step targets are set, and
slow, gradual improvement is envisaged.
We use the term bold strategy, if the NGO shifts to stronger
initiatives, exerts pressure, or tries to coerce its partners to im-
prove their environmental performance. High-flying aims of
bolder strategies may deliver step-like changes and significant
improvements, but chances of conflicts also grow that can ham-
per development.
Basic data
Name of the NGO:
Number of employees:
Approximate number of volunteers:
Questions
Please underline the answer that is characteristic for your or-
ganization!
Question 1
Suppose that your NGO would like to affect some companies
in a given branch of business so that they improve their environ-
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mental performance. Depending on the number of companies,
how would you change your strategy? Would you shift to bolder
or to more cautious strategy if you tried to influence more com-
panies?
We would not change our strategy.
We would use bolder strategy.
We would use more cautious strategy.
Question 2
Suppose that your NGO would like to shape the opinion of
some decision makers in a given decision making panel. De-
pending on the number of the decision makers, how would you
change your strategy? Would you shift to bolder or to more cau-
tious strategy if you tried to influence more decision makers?
We would not change our strategy.
We would use bolder strategy.
We would use more cautious strategy.
Question 3
Suppose that your NGO would like to affect the behavior of
some organizations. Depending on the number of organizations,
how would you change your strategy? Would you shift to bolder
or to more cautious strategy if you tried to influence more orga-
nizations?
We would not change our strategy.
We would use bolder strategy.
We would use more cautious strategy.
Question 4
Until now we conjectured that (leaving all other parameters
unchanged) unidirectional changes in the number of partners
(increase or decrease) shifts the strategy into the same direction
(so that it becomes bolder or more cautious). Is this conjecture
right?
Yes.
No. (Please briefly specify causes!)
Question 5
Until now we conjectured that your NGO applies the same
strategy in its relations with different partners whose status and
role in the given case is identical. Is this conjecture right?
Yes.
No. (Please briefly specify causes!)
Question 6
In which case would you choose bolder strategy: if the part-
ner’s approach was positive / negative / neutral / unknown?
Please write the words “positive”, “negative”, “neutral”, and
“unknown” next to the numbers. Number 1 means the most cau-
tious, number 4 the boldest strategy.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Question 7
If the approach of the partner was unknown, in which case
would you choose bolder strategies: if you tried to influence
companies / decision makers / organizations? If the order is un-
equivocal, please put the words “company”, “decision maker”,
and “organization” next to the numbers. (Number 1 should be
the most cautious, number 3 the boldest.) If other parameters
determine the boldness of the strategy, please specify it briefly!
Order:
1.
2.
3.
No unequivocal order, it depends on:
Question 8
Depending on the perceived importance of an actor in a given
case, how would you tune your strategies?
We would use bolder strategies in more important relations.
We would use more cautious strategies in more important re-
lations.
We would use the same strategy in all our relations.
Question 9
Have you ever encountered a case in the life of your NGO
that changes in the number of partners lead to changes in your
strategies? If yes, please briefly elicit the case!
III. Comments
Thank you very much for your assistance!
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